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1. INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER
This chapter provides an introduction to the study, a definition of the
problem statement and objectives, a background to the problem, and the
research design and methodology with three sub-hypotheses and an
overall hypothesis, and a synopsis of subsequent chapters.
1.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
Mergers and acquisitions have long played an important role in the
growth of firms (Mandelker, 1974:303) and recent years have seen
increasing levels of merger activity in most developed countries. Some
explanations gIven are those of tax considerations, inefficient
management of target companies and synergy.
Phoenix Rubber (Proprietary) Limited was a company that was started by
three shareholders, Messrs H.W.Schutz (German), L.T.Daniel and
T.N.Harrington and commenced for business on 1 July 1981. It was a
manufacturer of a wide range of industrial rubber components supplied
mainly to the mining, construction, and automotive sectors. After
consistently performing well with profits in excess of one million rands
per annum, a minimum threshold at which an application for listing could
3
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succeed, the company decided to initially list on the Development Capital
Market (DCM) in October 1987 in order to raise additional capital for
further expansion.
The 1985-1987 period witnessed share prices rising to record levels on
the JSE. In particular, 1987 recorded the highest number of listings in the
one hundred years of the stock exchange. A major feature of this year was
that for the first time since its creation in 1984, investors showed interest
in the DCM.
I was privileged to be associated with Phoenix Rubber Limited when it
was listed on the DCM on 6 October 1987. A year later on 1 December
1988 the company promoted to the main board of the JSE under the
Chemical and Oil sector. It was a highly successful company with good
products, markets, and loyal and long serving personnel. It merged with
Wayne Rubber (Pty) Ltd on 1 July 1989 and became Wayne
Manufacturing Limited. The existing shareholders became minority
shareholders of the enlarged company. Due to it's lack lustre share
performance, which was somewhat of an embarrassment to its holding
company Conshu Holdings Ltd, a subsidiary of SA Breweries, the
company's shares were de-listed on 22 October 1993.
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I have been intrigued by these chain of events, and ever since then, have
been keen to establish the real reasons for merging Phoenix Rubber, a
successful company, and whether benefits accrued to the acquiring
shareholders of Phoenix Rubber i.e. to Conshu Holdings, in this corporate
merger. The sad result of the merger was that the operations of Phoenix
were closed down, with its resultant loss of many skilled personnel, which
was a human tragedy in itself.
The procedure employed is to calculate the share valuation as at 1 July
1989 using Net Asset Value and Discounted Free Cash Flows techniques
on actual free cash flows for financial years ended June 1990 to June
1993. These will be related to the market prices of the shares prevailing
on the JSE at the time. This is to establish the post merger performance of
the shares of Phoenix Rubber Limited. Our study will span some six
years, from the company's listing to de-listing.
To confirm and illustrate these results the cumulative residuals under the
market model are calculated and shown in graph form reflecting the
abnormal returns effect of the share price behaviour before, during and
5
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after the merger of Phoenix Rubber. The share pnce of Wayne was
regressed against the All Share Index (ALSI).
Established literature is utilised extensively to correlate the company's
performance to the hypothesis that the shareholders of acquiring firms do
not benefit by the merger activity in the short term.
1.2 THE PROBLEM STATEMENT AND OBJECTIVES
My objective is to relate the share price performance of Phoenix Rubber
Limited pre and post merger to the literature on the performance of
acquired and acquiring companies.
The objective of the study is to establish whether the merger of Phoenix
Rubber Limited resulted in greater benefits to the acquired shareholders
than the acquiring shareholders.
1.3 THE BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM
Empirically, it has been found that stockholders of acquiring firms suffer
a statistically significant wealth loss over the five years following the
merger completion. The reason for the large negative returns after merger
remains an anomaly. One possibility is that the market is slow to adjust to
the merger event. If so, the long run performance reflects that part of the
6
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negative net present value of the merger to the acqmrer that is not
captured by the announcement period return.
My own experience relates to my tenure as financial director at Phoenix
Rubber Limited during its listing in October 1987 through to its merger
on 1 July 1989 until my departure at the end of July 1992. During the
period 1989-1992 the company changed its name to Wayne
Manufacturing Limited. Sadly, it de-listed on 22 October 1993.
This leads us to the hypothesis that "benefits accrued to the acquiring
shareholders of Phoenix Rubber in the corporate merger".
1.4 THE RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
The following methods will be used to measure performance:-
1. The calculation of market to book ratios for the whole period i.e. 1987
to 1993
2. Calculation of value in 1989 under Net Asset Value, Discounted Free
Cash Flows, and Dividend Growth Model.
3. The residuals under the market model: Rj = a + ~Rm + e
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Across a large sample of firms with acquisitions spread well over time,
we can be fairly confident that random effects will cancel out, and that no
one set of events, whether good or bad, will confound the analysis (Dodd,
1992). This study will not be attempting to do this as it is on one company
and will include random effects.
The research approach is an exploratory case study on one company,
Wayne Rubber. Phoenix Rubber merged in 1989 with Wayne Rubber,
the combined company being renamed Wayne Manufacturing Limited.
Share prices at monthly intervals together with All Share Index (ALSI),
have been obtained for the entire life of Phoenix Rubber (1987-1993)
from the JSE. The ALSI indices are used later in our study using the
market model (Bowman, 1983).
The objective of my study into post merger performance will be
performed by the examination of the overall hypothesis that greater
benefits accrued to the acquired shareholders of Phoenix Rubber in this
corporate merger than to acquiring shareholders.
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1. The first sub-hypothesis is concerned with the relationship between
the closing share price of Wayne Manufacturing Limited, pre and post
merger at 30 June each year to the net asset value per audited annual
financial statements. The hypothesis is that the market to book ratio
falls markedly in the post-merger period, reflecting a declining
performance for both acquiring and acquired shareholders.
2. The second sub-hypothesis: The value of Phoenix is less than the price
paid by Conshu, reflecting with hindsight. Thus the acquiring
shareholders do not benefit from the merger.
3. The third sub-hypothesis: Residuals under the market model will
reflect benefits to acquired shareholders prior to the merger, but
declining abnormal returns thereafter.
These hypotheses are consistent with the literature surveyed in the
following chapter.
1.5 SUBSEQUENT CHAPTERS
The contents of subsequent chapters are as follows.
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Chapter 2 is a literature review of empirical studies conducted and
literature written by various financial writers on new listings and post-
merger performance.
Chapter 2.1 outlines that mergers and acquisitions are founded on the
belief that the combination of two or more companies can provide
significant advantages because of enhanced strategic leverage, which
generates greater value in combined form than as separate entities.
In the case of mergers, two or more free-standing entities of equal
standing are amalgamated during which the original entities disappear to a
greater or lesser extent and a new single entity is formed.
In contrast, acquisitions pertain to the procurement of one or more free-
standing organisations by another company where the latter plays the
dominant role.
In the former case, both partners play an equal role in the marriage. In the
latter case, the partners are of unequal standing.
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Chapter 2.2 deals with the relationship between an acquiring and target
firm. This chapter is considered to be at the heart of this study and covers
growth maximisation as a common motive for corporate mergers albeit of
a resultant decline in shareholder wealth of acquiring shareholders. The
work of several leading researchers is outlined covering empirical results
on recent event studies on abnormal returns earned around takeover
announcement date.
Chapter 2.3 cites various reasons for the failure of corporate mergers,
such as:
failure to maintain focus on the customer;
overestimation of synergies ;
poor cultural fit;
inability to transfer skills; and
lack of vision and strong leadership
Chapter 3 discusses the rationale of the PhoenixlWayne merger starting
with the history of Phoenix Rubber in 1981, its listing in 1987, merger
with Wayne in 1989, and Wayne's de-listing in 1993. Wayne was
reversed into listed Phoenix and the intention was to use the expected
increased scrip price of the new listed company Wayne Manufacturing to
11
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make further acquisitions. The share price performed poorly after the
Phoenix merger, and three years later, the shares were de-listed.
Chapter 4 discusses in detail the financial performance of PhoenixlWayne
Rubber with excerpts from the published annual reports. The chapter ends
with empirical studies on share price behaviour, and the performance of
new listings.
Chapter 5 discusses different valuation methods, and initially, the purpose
of valuing a business. Four valuation methods are used and the writer
favours the discounted free cash flow method. The CAPM calculation is
shown with the beta derived from the regression.
Chapter 6 covers in detail the use of the market model to establish
abnormal returns. Market effects are removed from the share price to
derive the abnormal returns that show a declining trend after merger,
consistent with literature.
Chapter 7 is a discussion of the conclusions derived from the study
arising from the three hypotheses postulated in Chapter 1.4.
12
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
In this chapter the distinction between a merger and an acquisition IS
examined. An aquisition generally requires funds whereas a merger is
usually by an exchange of shares. Three motives classified as short-term
financial, long-term financial, and operating are covered in some detail.
These are synergistic motives and causes the value of the two firms when
combined to be greater than the sum of the two parts i.e. 2+2=5. The
chapter ends with an interesting study done on Japanese mergers that give
some insight into the way their cultural differences dictate business.
Mergers and takeovers have played an important role in shaping the
modern capitalistic economies. Until recently, economists did not attempt
to develop a formal theory of mergers and takeovers, explaining the
decision of one firm to merge with or take over another. Most writers
distinguish between mergers and takeovers (or acquisitions) on a purely
legal basis.
An acquisition or takeover of firm B by firm A occurs when company A
acquires more than 50 per cent of the equity of company B; after the
acquisition of the minority company B may cease to exist as a separate
13
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legal entity and be regarded as a division of company A. There are many
ways in which this may be done.
A merger between companies A and B occurs when the two companies
amalgamate and form a new legal entity to take over the businesses of A
and B which are dissolved.
This legal distinction between mergers and takeovers is of little interest
from an economic point of view, since the legal form of the amalgamation
has little to do with broader economic considerations, such as the motives
for, or the effects of, the amalgamation.
A more meaningful distinction between mergers and takeovers is the way
in which these two types of amalgamation occurs. A merger between two
companies A and B takes place when the managers of A approach B'S
managers directly; they negotiate the conditions of the amalgamation and
they agree upon a mutually satisfactory price; then B's managers use their
influence and proxy to persuade their stockholders to approve the merger.
In short, a merger takes place with the mutual agreement of the
managements of the merging companies. A takeover (or acquisition)
occurs when the shareholders of firm A directly make a tender offer and
14
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buy the shares of the stockholders of firm B at a price, which is usually
substantially higher than the current share price on the stock market. Such
a takeover usually takes place with opposition from B's managers. In
other words, a takeover involves a direct transaction between the
managers of A, the acquiring firm, and the stockholders of firm B, the
acquired firm.
Another difference between mergers and takeovers is that takeovers
usually require funds for the acquisition of one firm by another, while
mergers usually take place by an exchange of the shares of the merging
firms with shares of the new legal entity. This could also be undertaken
by an exchange of shares (Koutsoyiannis, 1982).
There appears to be a rationale for merging any firm with any other firm
in the economy.
The first consists of those motives that deal with synergy, causing the
value of the two firms combined to be greater than the sum of the two
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The second group of motives is based on the "under-valuation" of the
target company. Here value in the company is transferred from the selling
to the buying firm from the acquisition of undervalued assets.
The third set of motives consists of special managerial motives for
mergers, that self-interest of corporate managers may cause them to take
actions that do not harmonise with stockholder interests.
An example of short-term financial motives was the use of acquisitions to
boost EPS by acquiring companies with lower PIE ratios. The assumption
underlying this strategy is that the market mechanically applies the
buying firm's PIE ratio to the artificially increased EPS, thus increasing
stock price.
A second short-term financial consideration is improved liquidity.
Companies often acquire other firms with excess cash in order to improve
their own liquidity. It may be argued that the same objective can be
accomplished considerably more cheaply by going directly to capital
markets to raise capital.
16
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As a third short-term financial consideration there are often tax benefits
associated with acquisitions. Tax loss carryforwards may provide a tax
shield for the acquiring firm.
Turning to longer-term financial synergy another motive is to increase
debt capacity. Presumably, the larger size of the combined entity provides
lenders with greater protection, thus allowing the combined firm to have a
larger debt-to-capital ratio. Also contributing to greater debt capacity is
the diversification provided by conglomerates.
- That brings us to the second group of corporate motives for acquisitions -
those assuming target undervaluation. This was undoubtedly among the
most popular explanations offered for the merger wave of the late 1970's.
Under certain capital market conditions, it is argued, the liquidation value
of the firm's net assets could be considerably higher than the market value
of the firm's common stock. You could buy the stock of the firm far more
cheaply than by going on the market and buying directly the machines,
land, capacity and so on. These arguments are premised on an
identifiable, exploitable inefficiency in stock market pricing. Another
explanation has to do with "inside information". This is often cited as a
motive in "friendly" mergers, especially those in which besieged target
17
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firms voluntarily provide information to "white knights". So, if the buyer
has inside information which indicates that the stock of the target fum is
undervalued then this seems a legitimate motive for an acquisition - one
that can be reconciled with the premise of an efficient market.
A final explanation, is by far the most important and an interesting one.
And this is that this undervaluation is caused by the failure of
management to manage assets efficiently. Clearly management
inefficiency would be reflected in relatively depressed stock prices,
relative to stock prices of comparable firms run by more efficient
managers. In such cases, there is thus an opportunity to acquire poorly
managed firms at relatively low prices.
This brings us to the third group of motives. It concerns the extent to
which managers pursue their own interest at the expense of their
companies' stockholders. This one was very popular in the literature of
the 50's and 60's. Management sometimes deviates from the classical
economic objective of maximization of stockholder's wealth. Instead it
pursues private goals, growth, empire-building, power, prestige, and so
on. The forms of executive compensation that now prevail may explain
part of this divergence of managerial from stockholders interests.
18
MBA Dissertation - Strategic Financial Management
Post-merger performance and accrual of benefits in Wayne Rubber merger
Page 19 of86
There is one last managerial motive: acquisitions allow the buying firm's
managers in effect to diversify the risk that attaches to their own human
capital. The only way to diversify this risk is to diversify the firm. And
again, this diversification benefits managers, often at the expense of
stockholders (Baruch Lev, 1992).
The problem faced by researchers is finding a method for evaluating the
effect of a corporate merger or acquisition on stockholder wealth. At first
glance, it might appear that the success of an acquisition could be judged
only by observing the performance of the combined firm over a long
period in time.
Modem finance theory says that the most reliable way of measuring the
real economic performance of a company is to track its stock price against
the performance of the market as a whole. In an "efficient market", the
expected value of an acquisition will be estimated by the market and
reflected in changes in stock prices immediately upon the announcement
of the transaction (Dodd, 1992).
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As this is a case study rather than an event study the abnormal returns in
the Wayne case will include a lot of random effects ("noise") i.e. the
share price will be reacting to all information about the company, not just
the acquisition.
As a conclusion to this section a study by Pettway and Yamada (1986) on
Japanese mergers is included. This has been done because of the major
differences in management and environment between Japanese and
American firms. Cultural differences such as lifetime employment,
restricted labour mobility, seniority-based wages and company unions in
Japan may have contributed to the lower level of merger activity there.
The acquiring firm rarely takes the initiative. The moving party III
Japanese mergers is the selling firm, not the acquiring firm as is common
in American mergers. These many differences may cause Japanese
combinations to affect shareholders' wealth differently than American
mergers.
Often, the acquired firm will seek business or financial assistance from
the acquiring firm. Under such circumstances, The Japanese selling firm
may not be able to command as large a price as its American counterpart.
Additionally, if the selling firm is financially weaker than the buying
20
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firm, there may be more abnormal returns to the acquiring firm in Japan
than in the US.
Data for the period 1977 to 1984 covering 157 mergers were selected to
study Japanese mergers and the standard market model used. The results
indicate that, overall, information about the merger had a favourable
though insignificant effect on shareholders' wealth. The study by Pettway
et aI, may indicate that the much larger acquiring firm that does not
initiate the merger has sufficient market power to drive the price of the
acquired firm below present value. In Japan, the acquiring firm's
shareholders lost wealth (a significant loss of 7.7%) when the acquired
firm was larger than 20% of the size of the acquiring firm. Thus,
abnormal returns to shareholders of Japanese selling firms are well below
the gain received by acquired-firm shareholders in American mergers.
2.2 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AN ACQUIRING AND
TARGET FIRM
The pursuance of growth maximization has been a common motive for
corporate mergers. Various studies and their findings suggest a decline in
the wealth of acquiring shareholders. Jensen (1986) stated that the
companies with large free cash flows are likely to undertake mergers,
albeit oflow-benefit or loss in value. Bhana (1987), used the market
21
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model to establish that substantial abnormal returns are earned around the
takeover announcement date. Van der Honert et al (1988), concluded in
their empirical results that target companies experience significant gains
around the announcement date. Affleck-Graves et al (1988), in their study
indicated that the average premium on acquisition is around 30%.
Agrawal, et al (1992) in a study conducted on the NYSE found that
shareholders suffer a loss of about 10% over a five-year post-merger
period.
Although the speeding up of growth has been suggested by vanous
economists as a motive for mergers, according to Koutsoyiannis
(1982:249) it was a Dennis Mueller who presented a formal model of
mergers in which the merger activity is attributed to the growth-
maximisation goal of managers. According to Mueller the utility
functions of managers differ from those of stockholders. Stockholders are
mainly interested in the profits of the firm, while managers want job
security, power, status, high salaries and other perks. Empirical studies
suggest that both the pecuniary and non-pecuniary goals of managers are
relative to the growth rate of the firm. Managerial salaries, bonuses, stock
options and promotions all tend to be more closely related to the growth
of the firm than to its profits. Similarly, the prestige and power of
22
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managers are directly relative to the size and the growth of the company,
not to its profitability. Thus, managers are more interested in the size and
growth of the firm than in its profits. The separation of ownership from
management in the large corporations gives some discretion to managers
in setting the goals of the firm and they may use it to maximise their own
welfare. Given the close correlation between growth and the magnitudes
in which managers are interested, they set as their goal the maximisation
of the growth of the firm. This is a radical departure from the basic
premise of the neoclassical theory of the firm, which assumes that the
goal of managers is the maximisation of the profit or the welfare of
stockholders.
The pursuance of growth maximisation by managers affects their
investment policy in general, because their motivation for growth makes
them apply a lower discount rate than that of stockholders in evaluating
the future profitability of alternative investment opportunities open to the
firm at any time. The findings of a study by Arthur Dewing suggest that
the profitability of mergers is lower than that of non-merging firms, and it
declines over time. This would have a negative effect on the share
performance of merged companies (Koutsoyiannis, 1982)
23
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Jensen (1986) stated that free cash flow theory predicts which mergers
and takeovers are more likely to destroy, rather than to create, value; it
shows how takeovers are both evidence of the conflicts of interest
between shareholders and managers, and a solution to the problem.
Acquisitions are a way managers spend cash instead of paying it out to
shareholders. Therefore, the theory implies managers of firms with
unused borrowing power and large free cash flows are more likely to
undertake low-benefit or even value-destroying mergers.
Consistent with empirical evidence, free cash flow theory predicts that
many acquirers will tend to have exceptionally good performance prior to
acquisition. That exceptional performance generates the free cash flow of
the acquirer for the acquisition. Targets will be of two kinds: firms with
poor management that have done poorly prior to the merger, and firms
that have done exceptionally well and these targets with large free cash
flows refuse to pay to shareholders (Jensen, 1986)
A South African study by Bhana (1987) usmg the Market Model to
estimate the required risk-adjusted return for the chosen security, has
shown that shareholders of acquired companies earned fairly substantial
abnormal returns around the time of the takeover announcement. Insiders
24
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appear to take market positions on prospective takeovers approximately
40 trading days before the public announcement. Leakage of inside
information occurs at a significant level in the 15 trading days preceding
the public announcement of the proposed takeover. The results suggest
that registered insiders were not responsible for the abnormal trading in
the target companies during the three weeks before the public
announcement of the takeovers, substantial insider trading is carried out
through third parties in order to escape detection. The JSE appears to be
inefficient in reacting to the public announcement of the takeover
proposals: significant market reaction occurs in the five trading days
immediately following the announcement date.
Van den Honert, Barr, Affleck-Graves and Smale (1988) conducted a
study on the JSE over the period 1975 to 1985. They examine, in a
cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) framework, the effect of the
following features that emerge from their empirical results: in the related
mergers the acquiring firms on average do not lose value from merger
while the targets show significant gains. In the case of unrelated mergers
the acquirers lose, possibly due to the fact that they are unfamiliar with
the business. In contrast, the target firms show massive gains. Similar
results hold for the case where control is already held by an acquiring
25
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firm, i.e. acquirers do not lose by merger if they held prior control, but
their value is reduced if they did not have prior control. This may be due
to the reason that acquirers who hold prior control are involved in the
target firm and hence are familiar with the business. Van den Honert et aI,
used an extension of the market model referred to as the 2-factor market-
industry model that allows for the removal of both market and sector
effects.
When relative SIze was considered it was observed that acqUIrers on
average lost value by merger regardless of whether the target was small or
large. However, the target firms gained in both instances. An identical
result held when medium of exchange was the variable under
consideration - acquiring firms decreased in value, and targets gained.
A point that arises from van der Honert's study is that the acquiring firms
involved in merger activity do not tend to benefit in the short term from
the merger while the target firms do experience abnormal positive returns
around the announcement date.
In an empirical evaluation done on the premium on acquisition in South
African mergers, Affleck-Graves, Burt and Cleasby (1988), the results
26
MBA Dissertation - Strategic Financial Management
Post-merger performance and accrual of benefits in Wayne Rubber merger
Page 27 of86
indicated that in the South African context the average premium paid on
acquisition is of the order of 30-40%. This is approximately the same as
that paid on other major exchanges. Only the price/earnings ratio and
relative size, to a lesser extent, significantly correlates with the premium.
In both cases, the correlations were positive, indicating that a higher PIE
ratio in the target company and/or a target company, which is large
relative to the acquirer, will result in a higher premium on acquisition.
The results in that study indicate that a cash payment remains the most
popular method of payment in South African mergers, followed by an
equity swap.
A recent US study was done by Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) on
post-merger share-price performance of acquiring firms. Their paper
investigates share-price performance following corporate takeovers. Over
a long time period, postmerger performance should be zero in an efficient
market and the entire valuation effect associated with the combination
should occur, on average, at the time of the announcement.
They use multi-factor benchmarks from the portfolio evaluation literature
that overcome some of the known mean-variance inefficiencies of more
traditional single-factor benchmarks. Studying 399 US takeovers
27
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transacted in the 1975-1984 period, Franks et al conclude that previous
findings of poor performance after takeover are likely due to benchmark
errors rather than mispricing at the time of the takeover.
In a US study done on Post-Merger Performance of Acquiring Firms by
Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992), the evidence on post-merger
performance of companies over the period 1955 to 1987 on the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) was examined. Two methodologies were
employed each of which adjusts for both beta risk and market
capitalisation. All stocks on the NYSE were ranked according to their
market capitalisation. As there was a clustering in a certain size category,
an explicit adjustment for firm size seemed to be important. The first
method measures a stock's abnormal performance. This approach
calculates a different beta for each security over the entire post-
acquisition period. The second approach uses a methodology that
combines an adjustment for firm size. In this method a different beta is
calculated for each month relative to the event, assuming that this beta is
identical for all acquiring firms.
Agrawal et al (1992), found that stockholders of acquiring firms suffer a
statistically significant loss of about 10% over a five-year post-merger
28
MBA Dissertation - Strategic Financial Management
Post-merger performance and accrual of benefits in Wayne Rubber merger
Page 29 of 86
period. Their evidence suggests that neither the firm size nor the beta
estimation problems are the cause of the negative post-merger returns.
The results were inconsistent with the hypothesis that the result is caused
by a slow adjustment of the market to the merger event.
In a US study on Postacquisition Performance ofAcquiring Firms
Loderer and Maliin (1992) conducted the experiment with a
comprehensive sample of firms on the NYSE during the years 1966-1986.
The crux of the experiment was to test whether modified market model
measures of negative abnormal performance become insignificant when
risk is appropriately accounted for. One possible scenario is that during
times of intense acquisition activity, firms that want to fund their
acquisitions drive up the risk-free rate. When the activity subsides, the
risk-free rate could decline. Preacquisition estimates of the market model
intercept could therefore be correspondingly too high, which could lead to
downward bias in the computation of postacquisition abnormal returns.
Loderer and Martin found that there is some negative performance for the
first three years, especially during the second and third years after the
acquisition.
29
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This section concludes with a discussion on the protection of stockholders
or conversely, management entrenchment. In response to the wave of
takeovers in the late 1970's, many corporations have adopted
amendments that make it more difficult for potential acquirers to gain
control. More recently, senior executives have also begun to grant
themselves large bonus payments in the event their firm is acquired.
These "porcupine amendments" and "golden parachutes" have become
standard strategies designed by investment bankers.
The widespread adoption of such measures has further fuelled the debate
about the genuineness of management's service to its stockholders. Such
actions clearly increase the costs of changing corporate control, reducing
the profitability and the probability of takeovers.
In defence of the practice of instituting "golden parachutes", it is argued
that guaranteed compensation agreements strengthen the incentive for
target managers to act in their stockholders' best interests when faced
with an acquisition proposal. To the extent that potential bidding
companies could be deterred by the additional cost of a "golden
parachute", it may be worth less to stockholders as a correction of
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management incentives, than the loss resulting from the reduced
probability of takeover.
2.3 REASONS FOR FAILURE
This section discusses the reasons why corporate marriages fail.
Information from two sources is drawn because of their relevance to our
case study. McCarthy (1963) postulates five possible reasons and Amold
(1998) looks at three recurring themes, because mergers fail for a number
of reasons.
This chapter will be concluded with the reasons for the failure of business
combinations from the standpoint of the acquirer. The relevance to our
case study is indicated where applicable.
In an article by McCarthy (1963:40), the following reasons are included:-
"Lack of knowledge of the history and potential of the industry of
the seller". This does not apply in the Wayne Rubber merger as
both companies belonged in the rubber industry and were
competitors.
"Failure to fully investigate the seller's motives for selling and the
contribution required in management and financing in order to
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operate the successfully". This is not applicable in our case study
as the offer to purchase was made by the acquirer.
"Failure to determine how the acquisition will fit into the
combined enterprise and its expected contribution in profits,
management, marketing, and human resources".
"Making sweeping changes in management, personnel, policies,
and procedures after consummating the transaction but before
determining what made the acquired company successful". In the
process of merging the Phoenix and Wayne divisions under one
management team in 1992 a prolonged strike culminated in the
closure of the Phoenix plant, while the full rationalisation
programme was being implemented. This severely impacted on the
results for the year to 30 June 1992.
"Being overeager to effect the deal and accordingly paying too
high a price in terms of capital stock or cash for what is obtained".
In the Wayne merger the share price two weeks before announcement
date (12 May 1989) was 75 cents per share. Phoenix issued shares to
Conshu at 95 cents per share for 82% ownership. On 30 June 1989, a
day before takeover, the net asset value per share stood at 44 cents per
share.
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Why do mergers fail to generate value for acquiring shareholders?
A definitive answer as to why mergers fail to generate value for acquiring
shareholders cannot be provided, because mergers fail for a host of
reasons. However, there appear to be three recurring themes (Arnold,
1998: 876-877):
The strategy is misguided. The strategic plans turned out to be
value destroying instead of wealth creating. In the Wayne Rubber
merger two businesses with successful managements and
products/product market segments were being brought under the
control of a single management. This alienated the acquired
management team and the two companies workforces.
Over-optimism. Acquiring managers have to cope with uncertainty
about the future-potential of their acquisition. They may
underestimate the costs associated with the resistance to change
they may encounter, or the reaction of competitors. A prolonged
strike culminated in the closure of the Phoenix plant, while the full
rationalisation programme of combining the two management
teams was in progress and this destroyed shareholder value.
Failure of integration management. One problem is the rigid
adherence to prepared integration plans. Usually plans require
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dynamic modification in the light of expenence and altered
circumstances. The integration programme may have been based
on incomplete information and may need post-merger adaptation to
the new perception of reality.
Common management goals and the engendering of commitment
to those goals is essential. The morale of the workforce can be
badly damaged at the time of a merger. The natural uncertainty and
anxiety has to be handled with understanding, tact, integrity, and
sympathy. Communication and clarity of purpose are essential as
well as rapid implementation of change. Cultural differences need
to be tackled with sensitivity and trust established.
The absence of senior management commitment to the task of
successful integration severely dents the confidence of target and
acquired managers.
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3. THE PHOENIX RUBBERIWAYNE RUBBER MERGER
The chapter discusses the history of Phoenix Rubber from its
incorporation in 1981, to its listing in 1987, the rationale behind the
merger with Wayne Rubber in 1989, until the de-listing in 1993. Conshu
had used Phoenix as a vehicle for the reverse listing of Wayne.
Phoenix Rubber (Proprietary) Limited was a company that was started by
three shareholders, Messrs H.W.Schutz (German), L.T.Daniel and
T.N.Harrington and commenced for business on 1 July 1981. It was a
manufacturer of a wide range of industrial rubber components supplied
mainly to the mining, construction, and automotive sectors. After
consistently performing well with profits in excess of one million rands
per annum, a minimum threshold at which an application for listing could
succeed, the company decided to initially list on the Development Capital
Market (DCM) in October 1987 in order to raise additional capital for
further expansion.
Phoenix Rubber Limited was listed on the JSE on 6 October 1987. On the
12 May 1989 an announcement was made that Phoenix Rubber Limited
was to acquire Wayne Rubber (Proprietary) Limited, wholly owned by
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Conshu Holdings Limited (a listed subsidiary of South African Breweries
Limited).
For the acquisition on 1 July 1989, Phoenix Rubber Limited had to issue
48.2 million shares to Conshu Holdings Limited. The purchase
consideration was the business and assets of Wayne. By this additional
issue of shares, Conshu Holdings acquired 82% of the enlarged share
capital of Phoenix Rubber Limited. In effect, it was a reverse takeover.
After the merger, the name of Phoenix Rubber Limited was changed to
Wayne Manufacturing Limited on 13 August 1989. A dormant company
changed its name to the original Phoenix Rubber (Proprietary) Limited.
Wayne Manufacturing Limited became the holding company of Phoenix
Rubber (Proprietary) Limited and Wayne Rubber (Proprietary) Limited,
both wholly owned subsidiaries
Figure I below shows the structure of the companies before and after the
merger between Phoenix and Wayne in July 1989.
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FIGURE 1 - COMPANY STRUCTURE
In the circular sent out to shareholders of Phoenix Rubber Limited in May
1989 the rationale for the merger with Wayne Rubber was stated:
"The acquisition by Phoenix of Wayne Rubber, in exchange for the issue
to Conshu Holdings (Wayne's parent company) of 48.2 million ordinary
shares, gives the enlarged group the strongest platform for expansion in
the markets in which it operates".
"In addition, the combined resources of the new Phoenix present
significant opportunities for growth into new markets, which would have
proved too costly for either operation to contemplate individually.
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The backing of Conshu, which will hold 82% of the enlarged share capital
of Phoenix, brings another positive dimension and ensures the financial
support that will be necessary to implement longer term strategies.
Phoenix, to be renamed Wayne Manufacturing Limited after the merger,
will now be the country's dominant supplier in virtually every sector of
the rubber processing market, with a customer base ranging from mining
and industry to the medical and agricultural sectors".
"Once the merger has been successfully bedded down and the two
operations are running smoothly, the enlarged Phoenix will also be in a
stronger position to explore opportunities in the export markets in order to
complement the growth in the local market".
"The retention of the listing of Phoenix on the JSE will also be an
important factor in future plans, as acquisitions are expected to be an
integral part of future growth and the use of equity adds another option to
be considered in financing these opportunities".
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4. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF WAYNE RUBBER PRE AND
POST ACQUISITION
Detailed financial statistics are provided in this chapter and this is
complemented with excerpts from the company's annual reports and
graphical illustrations of the earnings per share and the share price
performance. The chapter ends with empirical studies by Bhana (1989),
and Bradfield and Hampton (1989) on share price behaviour, and
performance of new listings, respectively.
Prior to the Wayne Rubber merger on 1 July 1989, the company had
traded as Phoenix Rubber since its listing on 6 October 1987.
The following are the performance indicators pre and post acquisition:-
Table 1 - Performance indicators pre and post acquisition
YEAR Turnover EPS EN PIE NAV DN Share Price
(R'OOO) (cents) (%) (cents) (%) (cents)
1988 16,035 9.1 13.1 7.7 37.1 5.3 70.0
1989 21,490 11.6 13.6 7.4 44.3 5.4 85.0
1990 110,634 13.1 21.7 4.6 99.3 8.7 60.0
1991 129,779 15.2 19.0 5.3 108.5 7.5 80.0
1992 129,438 10.2 12.8 7.8 113.5 6.5 80.0
1993 119,588 3.9 7.7 12.9 116.4 2.0 50.0
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Explanation to abbreviations
EPS = Earnings per share (Earnings divided by the number of
shares in issue)
ElY = Earnings yield (Earnings per share divided by the market
price per share)
PIE = Price earnings ratio (the inverse ofElY)
NAV = Net asset value (Total shareholders funds divided by the
number of shares in issue)
DIY = Dividend yield (Dividend per share divided by the market
price per share)
The earnings per share for Wayne is shown graphically on Figure 2






1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
FIGURE 2 - EARNINGS PER SHARE
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The financial year ended 30 June 1989 was the first full year of trading
after listing in October 1987. The Chairman's review to the 1989 Annual
Report stated: "Phoenix Rubber achieved excellent results for the year
1988/1989. Net income after tax increased by 29.8% over the last year
despite the higher tax rate and earnings per share increased to 11.6 cents.
Turnover increased by 34.0% over the previous year with the economy
remaining buoyant throughout the period. A good demand for our rubber
products was felt in all our sections".
1990
The Chairman's statement in the Wayne 1990 Annual Report states, "the
financial year ending 30 June 1990 has been challenging and exciting for
both the company and its executives. The acquisition by Phoenix Rubber
Ltd of Wayne's assets from Conshu Holdings and the change of name of
your company to Wayne Manufacturing has proved to be worthwhile,
despite the fact that the expected synergies are taking longer to achieve
than originally anticipated. For the 12 months to June turnover rose to
RIll-million. A total dividend of 5.2 cents per share has been declared
out of earnings of 13 cents a share. Shareholders equity has increased by
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R56-million and now stands at R60-million which has had the effect of
boosting the net asset value of the share to 99,3 cents".
"During the year under reVIew, Wayne Manufacturing maintained its
position as a leading manufacturer of rubber and PVC products, despite
the continuing downturn in the business cycle, and on-going social and
industrial unrest. Demand declined in both the mining and industrial
sectors of the economy, however the company still managed to achieve an
increase in turnover - up 17,3% to R129,7 million, and earnings per share
- up 16,9% to 15,2 cents", the Chairman's statement to the Wayne 1991
Annual Report concluded.
In the Chairman's statement to the Wayne 1992 Annual Report it is stated
that the "the difficult trading conditions were exacerbated by a prolonged
strike, which arose out of the merging of the Phoenix and Wayne
divisions under one management team at the beginning year. The strike
culminated in the closure of the Phoenix plant while the full
rationalisation programme was implemented. The results for the year to
30 June 1992 do not reflect the full potential of the synergies to be gained
from the above rationalisation. Earnings per share declined by 33 percent,
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however they are considered to be satisfactory given the arduous business
conditions and the industrial action during the period".
Wayne did not produce an annual report for the year ended 30 June 1993
because of the company's impending de-listing. A document relating to a
"scheme of arrangement" was issued in September 1993. This was an
offer to minority shareholders for acceptance of a scheme consideration
amounting to R71,00 per 100 scheme shares held in Wayne. Minority
interests constituted 11,8% in Wayne. Wayne Rubber was to delist on the
JSE on 22 October 1993. At the time of de-listing Conshu held an 88.12%
interest in Wayne.
FIGURE 3 below illustrates the share performance of Wayne pre and post
merger. In February 1989 the share price reached a low of 55 cents but
progressively climbed to 90 cents at the end of June 1989, just before the
merger. The share price reached a peak of 100 cents in September 1989.
Lows were in July 1990 (48 cents), April 1991 (95 cents), August 1991
(100 cents), progressive drops to a low of 45 cents in July 1993 and a
price of 63 cents in October 1993, the month of de-listing.
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FIGURE 3 - SHARE PERFORMANCE
(An enlarged version is in Appendix 5)
The following explanation appeared in the scheme of arrangement
document: "Control of Wayne (then Phoenix Rubber Company Limited)
was acquired during 1989 when the Wayne Rubber division of Conshu
was sold to Phoenix for an issue of ordinary shares. It was intended that
the business of Wayne would be expanded and increased by way of
growth both organically and, more probably, by acquisitions utilising
share issues. For various reasons, sundry acquisitions sought by Wayne
have not come to fruition and the directors of Conshu (the holding
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company of Wayne) have accordingly resolved that, in view of the high
percentage shareholding of Conshu in Wayne, the continued listing of
Wayne is no longer justified".
As stated earlier, the share price two weeks before announcement date (12
May 1989) was 75 cents per share. Phoenix issued shares to Conshu at 95
cent per share for 82% ownership. On 30 June 1989, a day before
takeover, the net asset value per share stood at 44 cents per share. This
meant that the market value as indicated by the price per share (85,00
cents) on the JSE, exceeded the book value as expressed by the net asset
value per share (44,34 cents), by 1,92 times.
From Table 1, the EPS for the two years after merger, years 1990 and
1991, increased from 11.6 cents in 1989 to 13.1 and 15.2 in years 1990
and 1991 respectively. The PIE ratios correspondingly decreased because
of the higher earnings per share and a share price trading between a band
of 60 cents and 80 cents.
In year 1992, the EPS dropped to 10.2 cents (from 15.2 in 1991) because
of the strike and higher costs attributable to rationalisation coupled with a
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drop in turnover. The share price stood at a level of 80 cents at 30 June
1992 probably because of the share being tightly-held, 82% by Conshu.
The full impact of the rationalisation, effects of industrial action, coupled
with business downturn, resulted in the turnover plummeting by 7.6%
from Rl29-million to Rl20-million in June 1993. EPS dropped from 10.2
cents to 3.9 cents. In June 1993 the share price stood at 50 cents per share
on the JSE, NAV was 116.4 cents, and the MarketIBook ratio was down
to 0.43. In June 1989, this was 1.92.
The share prices during the final months of listing were as follows;-
Table 2 - Prices for final 5 months of listing
Month Share Price NAV
(cents) (cents)
June 1993 50,00 116,40
July 45,00 not available
August 62,00 not available
September 63,00 not available
October 1993 63,00 not available
Clearly, the benefits of a merger were not reflected in the share price nor
did it translate in the financial performance of the company post merger.
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The continued listing of Wayne on the JSE under the Chemicals and Oils
sector no longer became justifiable, firstly from the continued adverse
public exposure and secondly from the onerous reporting requirements
imposed on listed companies. Conshu decided to de-list Wayne on 22
October 1993.
Two studies done on new listings, share pnce behaviour on the JSE
(Bhana, 1989), and post-listing performance of new listings on the same
bourse (Bradfield and Hampton, 1989), are summarized below.
Bhana (1989) presented a paper to determine the price behaviour of new
listings on the JSE during the period 1985-1987. This is pertinent to our
case study as Phoenix listed in October 1987. The year 1987 recorded the
highest number of new listings in a single year during the lOO-year
history of the stock exchange.
A major feature of the 1985-1987 new issue market was that for the first
time since its creation in August 1984, investors showed interest in the
Development Capital Market (DCM). The DCM was specifically
established to give the smaller, entrepreneurial companies, which could
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not meet the stringent rules for listing, an opportunity to raise capital for
new development. This, in turn, attracted a new type of investor who was
prepared to accept higher risks for the possibility of large returns. Phoenix
listed on the DCM in 1987.
Most new issues during the 1985-1987 period opened at a huge premium
over their issue price. Bhana suggests that many new listings were priced
too low. Many companies that listed during this period were small (high-
risk) companies in the early stages of their development. These
compames had to offer investors adequate risk premiums for the
uncertainty during the post-listing period. Bhana used the Sharpe-
Lintner-Mossin capital asset pricing model developed by Bowman (1983)
to calculate the residual in each period, i.e. the 'abnormal return' for a
security.
The underperformance of new listings on the DCM was evident due to the
high-risk nature of companies on this sector. During the buoyant market
conditions preceding the 19 October 1987 stock market crash, prices of
new listings on the DCM rose more steeply than the rest of the market.
However, after the market crash the DCM underperformed the rest of the
market.
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Phoenix shares opened on 6 October 1987 at 80 cents on an offer price of
60 cents per share before dropping at month end to 65 cents as per Figure
3 and Appendix 5. In December 1988 Phoenix was promoted to the main
sector of the JSE. The share was never regarded as a high-risk security.
No plausible explanation can be offered by Bhana for the poor
performance of the sample of new issues during the one-year period
immediately after the listing. Phoenix was not part of the sample selected.
A common belief among several market observers is that investors often
overreact to the announcement of major corporate events. The huge
premiums accompanying a listing during the study period can be regarded
as an over reaction to the favourable news associated with the market
listing.
Bradfield and Hampton (1989), examine the post-listing performance of
new issues on the JSE. On the basis of an empirical study conducted over
the 1975-1986 period comprising 77 listings, evidence is presented
indicating that abnormal returns do occur during the post-listing period.
The excess return model was used to estimate returns that were
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higher/lower than expected on the basis of the systematic risk of the
security. Betas for each security were estimated using the well-known
market model, i.e. monthly returns regressed against the corresponding
returns on the JSE Overall index for one year subsequent to the listing
date.
The existence of hot and cold issue periods were found by Bradfield and
Hampton (1989) to be evident on the JSE and the performance in the
aftermarket is found to differ substantially in these periods. In hot issue
periods abnormal returns are found in almost the entire 12-month period
subsequent to listing, with excess returns reaching as much as 7% per
month during the subsequent year.
In the Wayne Rubber merger higher share prices occurred during two
periods, the 10 months March 1989 to December 1989, and the 15 months
April1991 to June 1992. It should be noted that between March 1988 and
January 1989 the share price remained at 60 cents, as there were no
trades.
The first period is before and after the merger in July 1989. An indication
of insider trading is evident as the announcement was made on 12 May
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1989. The share stood at 55 cents per share in February 1989. Appendix 6
illustrates how the share price moved to 75 cents in March 1989 and
moved in an average band of 84 cents before falling to 60 cents in January
1990. The average return on the share price was 59.52% as against the
market's return of 29.64%. This is an indication that the abnormal effect
was over by the end of December 1990.
The 'second period of higher share prices occurred between April 1991
and June 1992 during the period of rationalisation of Phoenix Rubber and
the expectation of continued good performance; which did materialise in
June 1991. Appendix 6 illustrates how the share price moved to 95 cents
in April 1991 and moved in an average band of 85.5 cents before falling
to 70 cents in July 1992. The average return on the share price was
26.18% as against the market's return of 20.22%. Subsequent to this, a
period of prolonged strike culminated in the full closure of the Phoenix
Rubber plant while the full rationalisation programme was being
implemented.
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5. DIFFERENT VALUATION METHODS
The purpose of valuing a business is to establish how much is a business
worth. Four valuation methods are used namely, net asset value,
discounted free cash flows, dividend growth model, and price earnings
ratio. For the CAPM calculation, the beta was derived from the regression
in Chapter 6 and this was assumed as constant throughout the period. The
favoured method is the discounted free cash flow method because of its
conceptual and theoretical content.
One of the vital, decisive factors in corporate marriages is the relatively
simple issue of the valuation of businesses. How much is a business worth
at a given time? A glib answer is the amount of money a buyer is prepared
to pay for it. But how does the buyer arrive at the proper price? Putting in
an offer for a company should not be too contrived on the face of it, but
proper pricing of a business can give rise to numerous difficulties. The
price to the vendor is an entirely different matter from the price the buyer
is prepared to pay. The value of a business depends upon the economic
and industrial climate, on whether or not the business activity is
considered 'fashionable', on the location of the activity, on the company's
research and development programme, on the quality of management, on
52
MBA Dissertation - Strategic Financial Management
Post-merger performance and accrual of benefits in Wayne Rubber merger
Page 53 of 86
the assumed economies accruing from closer integration of the two firms
and on many other factors.
The purchase of a company, for instance, on past considerations alone is
nothing more or less than retreat into history. Past financial achievements
are not necessarily indicative of future earnings, much less of future
performance. Nor is it possible to access the real benefits of a proposed
integration until consultants have examined the feasibility of gearing the
two companies' operations to each other. The market for the products
made by the firm to be acquired should be carefully examined and
evaluated since yesterday's sales are not indicative of tomorrow's demand.
Only when all these considerations have been examined can the value of a
business be assessed - a value which is fair to buyer as well as to the seller.
A purchase price or exchange ratio for securities of two companies in a
business combination is generally arrived at as the result of negotiation. In
reaching an agreement on price, a number of factors should be considered,
some of which are readily susceptible to evaluation, and some not. If it
were possible to precisely determine the future earnings contribution and
dividend-paying capacity to the combined enterprise of a company to be
acquired, return on investment should be the sole criterion of present
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value, and every other factor discarded. Unfortunately, one cannot foretell
the future; and, therefore, historical and current data traditionally have
been as indicative of future earnings and dividend prospects.
Nevertheless, experts recogmse prospective earnmgs to be the most
important factor in valuing operating companies whose worth is largely
dependent on continuance as a going concern. On the other hand, for
companies with substantial holdings of disposable assets, such as securities
or real estate, or operating companies that have been sustaining losses for
several years or more, overall valuation might be related more closely to
the fair market or liquidating values of the underlying assets.
In addition to potential earnings and net assets, which are acknowledged
factors, dividend-paying capacity; market prices of capital stocks, III
relevant cases; and other considerations such as the acquisition of
management and technical know-how are important in valuing a company.
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Four valuation methods will be used:-
1. Net Asset Value (NAV)
Purpose: To calculate market to book ratio and thus establish whether
the market to book ratio falls markedly in the post-merger period thus
either confirming or negating the first sub-hypothesis.
2. Discounted Free Cash Flows (with hindsight)
Purpose: To compare with 95 cents paid by Conshu
3. Dividend Growth Model (DGM)
Purpose: To compare with 95 cents paid by Conshu
4. Price Earnings Ratio (PIE)
Purpose: To compare the valuation with the 95 cents paid by Conshu
Overall, the purpose of methods 2, 3, and 4 is to establish whether the
second sub-hypothesis - that the value of Phoenix is lower than the price
paid by Conshu - is true.
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Net Asset Value (NAV)
The balance sheet seems an obvious place to start when faced with the task
of valuation. In this method the company is viewed as being worth the sum
of the value of its net assets. The balance sheet is regarded as providing
objective facts concerning the company's ownership of assets and
responsibilities to creditors. Fixed assets are recorded along stocks,
debtors, cash and other liquid assets. With the deduction of long-term and
short-term creditors from the total asset figure we arrive at the NAV,
which is often called equity shareholders funds.
Many stockholders regard book "net worth" as a minimum valuation of
their company. Accordingly, net book equities, giving effect sometimes to
investment replacement costs, should be considered in valuing a company
for acquisition or merger purposes.
Audited balance sheets and income statements for financial years 1988 to
1993 are tabulated as per Annexure 1 and 2. This is the entire period of
listing. It includes the financial years 1988 and 1989, which were pre
acquisition. The NAV for each year will be divided by the number of
shares in issue, to arrive at the NAV per share.
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Table 3 below shows the summarized data: -
Table 3 - Salient financial data for years ended 30 June
Description 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Shareholders funds (Rm) 3,9 4,7 60,3 65,9 69,0 70,7
No of shares in issue (m) 10,4 10,7 60,7 60,7 60,7 60,7
Net asset value (cents) 37,1 44,3 99,3 108,5113,5116,4
Share price (cents) 70,0 85,0 60,0 80,0 80,0 50,0








1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
I-+- MKT/BK I
The market to book ratio is depicted graphically on Figure 4
FIGURE 4 - MARKETIBOOK RATIO
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Since acquisition on 1 July 1989, Wayne has under performed relative to
the pre-merger period as the book value is below the market value whereas
it was previously above. In other words, the share is trading at a huge and
increasing discount to the net asset value per share whereas it previously
traded at a large premium. The situation improved slightly in 1991 and
1992 when the share traded at 80 cents. Four months before it de-listed in
June 1993, Wayne's share traded at 43% of its net asset value.
Thus the first hypothesis is established to be true.
Discounted Free Cash Flows (with hindsight)
An income-based valuation method is cash flow. In business it is often
said that 'cash is king'. From the shareholder's perspective the cash flow
relating to a share is crucial - they hand over cash and are interested in the
ability of the business to return cash to them.
The cash flow approach involves the discounting of future cash flows, that
is, the cash generated by the business after capital investment in fixed
assets, working capital increases and tax payments. To derive the cash
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flow attributable to shareholders, any interest paid in a particular period is
deducted. These future cash flows are discounted at the required rate of
return i.e. the discount rate. In the case of Wayne, CAPM was used for the
cost of equity capital.
Free cash flows are calculated using information from the audited financial
statements of Wayne for the four years 1990 to 1993, after merger. Year 1
is 1990 through to year 4 as 1993. The full workings are shown on
Appendix 3.
The discount rate was calculated as hereunder: -
RlSK FREE RATE (RSA 13%2005)= 17.17%
(see page 60)
OVERALL MARKET RETURN (1.422 x 12) = 17.06%
(The average of 1.422 is derived from Appendix 6)
BETA (FROM REGRESSION) = -0.039339 (LEVERED BETA)
(The beta is obtained from the regression in Appendix 7)
Calculation of cost of equity
For this purpose the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) will be used
and the basis of arrival of the constituents of this formula will be
discussed below:-
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CAPM = Rj (Ke) = Rf + ~ (Rm -Ri)
CAPM is the dominant model for estimating the cost of equity. The great
advantage claimed for using the CAPM over other methods of estimating
the cost of equity is that the finance manager can calculate a cost that
reflects investors' perceptions of the riskiness of his company's shares.
When combined with the cost of other sources of finance, this can be used
to calculate the weighted average cost of capital that can then be used as a
cut-off rate to discount cash flows and determine the acceptability of
capital investment proposals.
Ke = cost of equity
Rf = interest rate available on a risk free bond
Rm = return required to attract investors to hold the broad market
portfolio of risky assets
~ = the relative risk of the particular asset
Rf = for risk free rate the long bond RSA 2005 as June 26 1989 was used
as this is a gilt rate (Financial Mail, June 30 1989).
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Rrn = the monthly return achieved on the ALSI index was averaged over
the 72 months period.
~ = as the beta was not available for Phoenix Rubber, the beta for the
whole period that Phoenix was listed was obtained from the regression of
the market model. Assumption: that it stayed the same throughout the
period of study.
The beta is a levered beta (~e) for a company with debt. Beta is broadly
measured by comparing the change in share price for a period, usually
one month, with that of a general stock market index. If this process is
repeated a number of times its results can be plotted on a graph. When a
share appears insensitive to market price changes, as in the case of
Wayne, this attributes to it an unrealistic low beta.
Rj = 17.17 - 0.039339 (17.06-17.17)
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The discount factors were computed as follows-
For year 1 it was 1/(1.0+0.1717) = 0.8535
For year 2 it was 1/(1.0+0.1717)(1.0+0.1717) = 0.7284
For year 3 it was 1/(1.0+0.1717)(1.0+0.1717)(1.0+0.1717) = 0.6217
For year 4, it was 1/(1.0+0.1717)(1.0+0.1717)(1.0+0.1717)(1.0+0.1717)
= 0.5306
The cumulative net present value at year 4 (in 1993) was R20,533 m. To
arrive at the terminal value in 1993, the earnings for that year of R2,349
was multiplied by the PIE of 12.9 to arrive at the value for the firm of
R30,302. The latter was multiplied by the discount rate of 0.5306 to arrive
at a discounted terminal value ofRI6,078.
The value arrived at of RI6,078m, plus the cumulative net present value of
R2,330m summed up to a total value for the company ofR18,408m
A value per share of 30 cents is arrived at by dividing the total value for
the company, by the number of shares in issue of 60,732m.
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Dividend Growth Model (DGM)
When dividend-paying capacity IS a factor, it should be based on
indicated potential rather than the historical record. Dividends paid in the
past may have no relation to the potential in this regard, particularly in a
closely held company like Wayne where here is every tax incentive to
hold down dividend payments. Further, a company embarked on a
substantial program of capital expansion or improvement may have
financed a large part of such costs by the retention of more than a normal
share of current earnings.
The dividend valuation model is based on the premise that the market
value of ordinary shares represents the sum of the expected future
dividend flows, to infinity, discounted to present value.
If the annual rate of growth in dividends tracks that of earnings at an
average 7%, over four years, and the cost of capital remains constant at
17.17%, cost of equity per CAPM, then the expected share price can be
estimated using the dividend growth model. It is to be noted that the
average earnings growth would be higher had there not been zero growth
during the last two years.
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With the assistance of the CAPM to determine the required rate of return,
the dividend growth model is probably the most widely used as one of the
methods to assist in establishing the value of an ordinary share. The
model is based on the assumption that earnings growth is at a constant
rate and that the dividend policy is to pay dividends in a fixed proportion
to earnings. The valuation formula is as follows:
Po = Do(l +g) Dl
k-g . Ke-g
Do = the dividend paid now
D1 = expected dividend in year 1 (1990) = 5.2 cents
Ke = cost of equity (rate of return)






The 7% rate of growth was calculated using the average for four years
dividends declared (with hindsight) per table 4 as follows: -
64
MBA Dissertation - Strategic Financial Management
Post-merger performance and accrual of benefits in Wayne Rubber merger
Page 65 of86
Table 4 - Dividends per share declared and growth
Year Period Dividends Growth
(cents) (%)
1989 YrO 4.6 n/a
1990 Yrl 5.2 13.04
1991 Yr2 6.0 15.39
1992 Yr3 5.2 zero
1993 Yr4 1.0 zero
The valuation arrived at is with hindsight as the price is based on future
actual financial data that was available. If these were not available and an
assumed higher growth rate was used the valuation would be higher. This
is because the higher the growth rate deducted from discount factor used
as the divisor, the higher the computation of the quotient (share value).
It is felt that the value of 51 cents for Wayne is reasonable in relation to
the two valuations arrived at using the other two valuation methods.
Price Earnings Ratio (PIE)
The most popular approach to valuing a share is to use the price-to-
earnings ratio. This compares a firm's share price with its latest earnings
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per share. Investors estimate a share's value as the amount they are
willing to pay for each unit of earnings
The increase in share price and resulting capital gain is one of the main
attractions of investing in shares. The PIE ratio measures the multiple of
earnings for which the shares of a company are selling and is calculated
as follows:
PIE = Market price of share
Earnings per share
Table 1 shows the PIE ratios for Wayne for the financial years 1988 to
1993.
The ratio is considered as a yardstick for investor sentiment with regard to
a share. It is a fairly crude measure, but should be included when valuing
the shares of a company. It is usual to take the PIE of a similar listed
company and by applying it to a company, a reasonable estimate of the
share price can be obtained. To arrive at the projected share price for
Wayne the PIE for the Chemicals, Oils and Plastics sector for June 1989
of 12.65 was multiplied by the Phoenix earnings per share for June 1989
of 11.6 cents, per Table 1 in Chapter 4. (The PIE of 12.65 was obtained
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from Econometrix and is according to JSE data stored on their time series
data base for the Chemicals and Oil board in June 1989.)
This implies that the value of a share may be determined usmg the
following formula:
Po = PIE xEPS i.e. 12,65 x 11.6 = 147 cents
where Po = the value of an ordinary share
PIE = the price earnings ratio of the Chemicals, Oils and
Plastics sector in June 1989
EPS = the earnings per share for Wayne in June 1989
Shares that are expected to perform well tend to have high PIE ratios
because investors expect the future profits to be high and are therefore
prepared to pay more for the shares. A company which has poor future
prospects will reflect a low PIE ratio.
Valuations are necessary whenever an investor wishes to purchase a
business or shares in a business. Valuations relate only to future
expectations and all valuation decisions require predictions about
anticipated future events. Once a valuation has been performed the value
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is compared with the price. Only if the value is greater than the price will
the purchase transaction take place.
The favoured method is to discount all future cash flows by the required
rate of return. This is fundamental in all aspects of finance and is
conceptually sound and theoretically correct. It is made difficult however
by the uncertainty surrounding the predictions of future cash flows and
the necessity of determining an appropriate rate of return with which to
discount the stream of predicted cash flows to arrive at an appropriate
valuation.
The results under the four methods may be summarised as follows:
Method 1: Net Asset Value (June 1989)
Method 2: Discounted FCF's
Method 3: Dividend Growth Model





The price paid by Conshu in 1989, of 95 cents was in excess of the value
of 30 cents calculated under favoured method 2, being the Discounted Free
Cash Flows, and under method 3. However, under method 4, the Price
Earnings Ratio, the actual price paid by Conshu was at a discount to this
valuation. (This valuation uses only information available at the time,
whereas methods 2 and 3 include subsequent events.)
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It is assumed that Conshu used the prevailing share price of 75 cents in
March/April 1989, at the time of negotiations, and applied an expected
growth factor of 1.25, in arriving at the purchase price of 95 cents. In June
1989 the share price in fact reached 90 cents and peaked to 100 cents in
September 1989 before falling to lower levels. History has shown that the
share price averaged 70 cents per share from date of merger to de-listing.
In conclusion, the share was overvalued in terms of method 2 and 3. This
means that the acquiring shareholders did not benefit from the merger, thus
confirming sub-hypothesis 2 of an overpayment for Phoenix shares by
Conshu.
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6. USE OF MARKET MODEL TO ESTABLISH ABNORMAL
RETURNS
In order to see the effects of events including the merger announcement
with Wayne Rubber, market effects have to be removed from the share
price by running a simple regression through the data. This is known as
the market model. What is derived from the equation is the abnormal
return (residuals). The graph of the monthly cumulative average residuals
show positive abnormal returns prior to announcement date, increasing
returns eight months after merger but declining abnormal returns
thereafter.
There is always clearly some factor in the marketplace that affects all
stocks to a greater or lesser extent. The market model is predicated on the
fact that most stocks tend to go up and down together. In mathematical
terms, it is expressed simply as a linear equation, which measures the
degree of co-movement between an individual stock and the market.
The important things about the market model are that: -
(a) It is based on the observable fact that most stocks tend to go up and
down with "the market" to a greater or lesser extent, and
(b) It gives us a practical way of measuring the risk of an individual
security or portfolio of securities.
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Some form of the market model, is invariably used to measure investment
risk. By comparing the behaviour of a stock against the behaviour of the
market, we can measure the degree to which that particular asset tends to
move with the market ("systematic" risk, as measured by beta), and the
extent to which it tends to move independently (error term or "residuals").
Residuals are "unsystematic" risk and can be diversified away. We may
also determine whether a price movement is an exaggerated or a subdued
version of the general stock; that is, whether an individual stock has a
"systematic" risk that is greater or less than the average "systematic" risk
of the market (MacQueen, 1992).
In the Wayne Rubber case, in order to see the effects of specific events,
including the merger with Wayne Rubber, on Phoenix Rubber, we will
have to remove the market effects from the share price data by running a
simple regression through the data using the equation:
Rj = a + ~.Rm + e
a = alpha term is a constant, derived from the regression, that indicates
the abnormal return for the entire period that Phoenix was listed
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Rm = the returns on the All share index for a time interval, in our case
monthly
e = error term, i.e. the residuals, derived from the regression, which
shows the effect of the events of each time interval (in our case, month).
This is the market model - a single index model of share price behaviour
- often used in event studies - the beta (P) is calculated from the model
and applies for the whole period. This is not the CAPM so one does not
need a risk-free rate or an equity market premium.
What you derive from the regression is the abnormal return:
The alpha (a) term (a constant that indicates the abnormal return for the
period as a whole - in our case the entire period during which Phoenix
was listed)
And the error (e) term or 'residuals', which shows the effect of the events
of each time interval (in our case month)
The monthly returns on the share and on the market were calculated using
the formula (Pl- Po)/Po from the data in Appendix 4 and are reflected in
Appendix 6.
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A linear regression was done on the above data, the results of which are
shown in Appendix 7. The Regression analysis, is for the entire period of
the listing with the monthly returns (CAR) regressed against the returns
for ALSI for the entire period from listing to delisting i.e. October 1987
to October 1993.
The following results emerge from the regression:-
Seventy two observations were made. The alpha is 0.01446, the student t-
stat of 1.910 is close to 2 which indicates that the alpha is significant, i.e.
the result is reliable. The regression analysis indicates that there is no
relationship whatsoever between the ALSI and the Wayne share price as
the Beta is negative (-0.03934) and not significant with a t-statistic of
-0.621.
The following results were produced:-









(Extract from Appendix 7)
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While the removal of the market effects is thus not particularly
meaningful, the subsequent focus on non-market residuals can
nevertheless be meaningfully done.
It must be borne in mind, however, that these residuals will reflect all
company specific risk and not only that relating to the merger (the beta
being insignificant also means that there may be some market effects in
the residuals.)
The cumulative average residuals (CAR) are reflected in Appendix 8 and
graphically illustrated in Figure 5 and Appendix 9.
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FIGURE 5 - CUMULATIVE AVERAGE RESIDUALS
(An enlarged version is in Appendix 9)
In the Wayne Rubber merger positive abnormal returns occurred prior to
merger and declining returns thereafter. Two significant periods are
evident when negative abnormal returns prevailed. The first of such
periods started as from the time of listing in October 1987 and continued
until April 1988. This correlates with the study by Bhana (1989) when it
was found that the DCM sector underperformed the rest of the market
after the stock market crash of October 1987. The second instance of
significant negative abnormal returns occurred during the period August
1992 to March 1993. This coincides with the period of upheaval when
there was industrial action and a rationalization programme was being
75
MBA Dissertation - Strategic Financial Management
Post-merger performance and accrual of benefits in Wayne Rubber merger
Page 76 of86
implemented during which earnings declined by 33%. Such a situation is
regarded as unsystematic risk but because Conshu owned 88.12% of the
shareholdings at that stage, the risk could not be diversified away and this
lead to negative abnormal returns. An indication of insider trading is
evident in the trend line showing increasing abnormal returns before the
merger announcement date of 12 May 1989.
The abnormal returns peaked in February 1990 on the back of sparkling
results of the target company for June 1989, but declining thereafter and
is consistent with established literature. This is an indication of a decline
in shareholder value to acquiring shareholders.
In a study by Affleck-Graves, Flach and Jacobson (1988) usmg the
market model, they found that using sector indices in conjunction with the
market index does not significantly alter the interpretation of the results.
This similarity can possibly be explained by the fact that the sector
indices show a high degree of co-movement with the market and is
consistent with the absence of any significant 'industry' effects on the
JSE as found by Visser and Affleck-Graves in a study in 1983.
76
MBA Dissertation - Strategic Financial Management
Post-merger performance and accrual of benefits in Wayne Rubber merger
Page 77 of86
Their study also indicated definite positive abnormal returns to the
shareholders of the acquired companies in the period preceding the
announcement, in the case of Wayne, 1 July 1989.
In general, therefore, the results in the Affleck et al (1988) study indicate
that the overall conclusion that shareholders of the acquired companies
gain from merger activity and that shareholders of the acquiring
companies do not, is unaffected by the methodology used; market index
or sector/industry index.
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7. CONCLUSION
It is not known what valuation method Conshu used in arriving at an
acquisition price of 95 cents per share for Wayne in 1989. A PIE ratio of
nearly 8 was implied, on a share price of 95 cents and a projected
earnings in the first year (1990) of 12 cents i.e. 20% onto the 10 cents per
share expectedlforecast for 1989.
The financial performance of Wayne since merger was lack-lustre and
profitability deteriorated from 1992 until de-listing in 1993. Although the
PIE rose to 7.8 times earnings multiple in 1992 this was attributable to the
lower earnings (EPS 10.2) and higher share price (80 cents). In 1993 the
EPS was 3.9 and the share price 50 cents resulting in a PIE of 12.9.
In the linear regressions that were conducted using the market model to
see the effects of the merger by removing the market effects from the
share price data the results proved that there is no relationship whatsoever
between the Wayne share price and the market (ALSI). The abnormal
returns, although declining, were mainly positive with the exception of
the two periods October 1987 to April 1988 and August 1992 to March
1993. From past studies carried out a common belief held among several
market observers is that investors often overreact to the favourable news
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associated with the market listing, Bhana (1989). The abnormal positive
effect from March to December 1989 period was during this hot issue
period. The effect should have been over by the end of 1989.
In this study it has been established beyond any doubt that benefits did
not accrue to the acquiring shareholders of Phoenix Rubber. With one
exception, neither set of shareholders benefited, but the original
shareholders of Phoenix suffered less than the Wayne Rubber
shareholders, in other words they gained more In relation to their
proportionate share of the enlarged company.
The founder of Phoenix, Mr H.W.Schutz, took advantage of a "golden
parachute" clause in the agreement of merger dated 13 May 1989 relating
to restraints of trade, within the first three years of signing the agreement.
A 'golden parachute' is an 'escape' clause that is a guaranteed
compensation agreement. It has been argued that this strengthens the
incentive for target managers to act in their shareholders' best interests
when faced with an acquisition proposal.
According to the agreement negotiated by the controlling shareholders of
Phoenix and Conshu, Schutz was to have total control of the Phoenix
division that operated out of the Jacobs factory. A strike price of RI.20
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per share was embodied in the agreement for Conshu to honour the
agreement regarding Schutz's total involvement (control). In turn, Conshu
would not have to payout the premium price as the shares of Schutz
would be retained in his hands to strengthen the incentive for him to act in
the interests of the shareholders.
Due to internal politics regarding control of Phoenix, this did not pan out
that way and in March 1992 Conshu paid Schutz the premium price of
R1.20 per share, in terms of the agreement, on his shareholding of over 2
million shares. The share was then trading at a price of between 70 and 75
cents. Although it was not envisaged that it should conclude that way,
Schutz benefited significantly from the merger.
It is easy to make recommendations with hindsight which is the best
foresight but the following may be learnt from this exploratory study:-
(a) The market to book ratio declined markedly after merger reflecting
declining company performance for both acquiring and acquired
shareholders. The rationalisation of two companies should not be
prescribed hastily as no synergy is attained in the short term. A
gradual programme of integration would have increased shareholder
value and resulted in a contented workforce.
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(b) The price paid by Conshu was too high in relation to the value of
Phoenix. From an economic standpoint you should not merge unless
there is value adding. There should be synergies and this is generally
of a financial aspect. This did not prevail in the Wayne merger and the
acquiring shareholders did not benefit from the merger.
(c) There were benefits to acquired shareholders prior to merger, but
declining abnormal returns thereafter consistent with literature. It was
not beneficial to force the acquired company management, who had
already been successful in their business, to be foisted with the
corporate culture of the acquiring company. This is what happened at
Wayne after the Phoenix merger.
In the case of Wayne, it is evident that the failure to integrate
management into a cohesive unit led to the collapse of the merger.
Neither sets of shareholders benefited, but the original shareholders of
Phoenix suffered less than the Wayne Rubber shareholders i.e. more than
a proportionate share of enlarged company.
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WAYNE MANUFACTURING LIMITED
BALANCE SHEETS FROM JUNE 1988 TO JUNE 1993 AND SALIENT STATISTICS
R'ooo R'ooo R'ooo R'ooo R'ooo R'ooo
YTD YTD YTD YTD YTD YTD
Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual
Description Jun-88 Jun-89 Jun-90 Jun-91 Jun-92 Jun-93
EMPLOYMENT OF CAPITAL
FIXED ASSETS 3,596 4,791 49,495 49,895 52,843 50,969
LOAN TO HOLDING COMPANY 8,200
LOAN TO SHARE TRUST & LOAN LEVY 247 247 246 282 123 124
TOTAL NON CURRENT ASSETS 3,843 5,038 49,741 58,377 52,966 51,093
CURRENT ASSETS
INTER-GROUP LOANS 2,352 11,495
STOCK 1,713 1,858 12,978 14,115 20,771 19,651
DEBTORS 2,280 3,600 21,186 22,756 25,837 21,531
CASH 854 282 217 74 21 12
4,847 5,740 34,381 36,945 48,981 52,689
CURRENT LIABILITIES
CREDITORS 1,708 1,858 15,167 15,484 18,524 18,921
BANK OVERDRAFT & SHORT TERM BORROWI NGS 502 502 1,801 2,362 741 3,062
TAXATION 719 1,022 377 2,068 3,315
SHAREHOLDERS FOR DMDENDS 229 332 2,247 2,581 2,095 607
3,158 3,714 19,215 20,804 23,428 25,905
NET CURRENT ASSETS 1,689 2,026 15,166 16,141 25,553 26,784
TOTAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAPITAL 5,532 7,064 64,907 74,518 78,519 77,877
CAPITAL EMPLOYED
CAPITAL AND PREMIUM 2,009 2,143 46,964 46,964 46,964 46,964
NON-DISTRIBUTABLE RESERVES 735 770 6,087 6,017 5,643 5,287
DISTRIBUTABLE RESERVES 1,126 1,830 7,274 12,932 16,346 18,444
TOTAL SHAREHOLDERS FUNDS 3,870 4,743 60,325 65,913 68,953 70,695
OUTSIDE INTEREST IN SUBSIDIARIES (36)
DEFERRED TAXATION 992 1,303 3,941 7,453 9,059 7,182
LONG-TERM BORROWINGS 670 1,054 641 1,152 507
TOTAL CAPITAL EMPLOYED 5,532 7,064 64,907 74,518 78,519 77,877
NO OF SHARES IN ISSUE 10,420,000 10,697,608 60,732,294 60,732,294 60,732,294 60,732,294
NET ASSET VALUE PER SHARE (CENTS) 37.14 44.34 99.33 108.53 113.54 116.40
SHARE PRICE (CENTS) 70.00 85.00 60.00 80.00 80.00 50.00
MARKET/BOOK RATIO 1.88 1.92 0.60 0.74 0.70 0.43 APPENDIX 1
WAYNE MANUFACTURING LIMITED
INCOME STATEMENT AND SALIENT STATISTICS
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
R'OOO R'OOO R'OOO R'OOO R'OOO R'OOO
TURNOVER 16,035 21,490 110,634 129,779 129,438 119,588
INCOME BEFORE TAXATION 1,967 2,598 10,568 13,475 9,864 3,965
TAXATION 1,015 1,393 2,673 4,243 3,666 1,616
ATTRIBUTABLE TO OUTSIDE SHAREHOLDERS 31
INCOME ATTRIBUTABLE TO SHAREHOLDERS 952 1,236 7,895 9,232 6,198 2,349
DNlDENDS 386 492 3,158 3,644 3,158 607
RETAINED INCOME FOR THE YEAR 566 744 4,737 5,588 3,040 1,742
TFR FROM/(TO) NON-DISTRIBUTABLE RESERVE (40) 707 70 374 356
RETAINED INCOME AT BEGINNING OF YEAR 560 1,126 1,830 7,274 12,932 16,346
RETAINED INCOME AT END OF YEAR 1,126 1,830 7,274 12,932 16,346 18,444
EARNINGS PER SHARE (CENTS) 9.14 11.55 13.00 15.20 10.21 3.87
SHARE PRICE (CENTS) - AT YEAR END 70.00 85.00 60.00 80.00 80.00 SO.OO
EARNINGS YIELD 13.1% 13.6% 21.7% 19.0% 12.8% 7.7%
PIE RATIO 7.7 7.4 '4.6 5.3 7.8 12,9
DNlDEND YIELD 5.3% 5.4% 8.7% 7.5% 6.5% 2,0%
DNlDEND COVER 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.0 3.9
RETENTION RATIO 59% 60% 60% 61% 49% 74%
DNlDEND PER SHARE 0.037 0.046 0.052 0.060 0.052 0.010
APPENDIX 2
WAYNE MANUFACTURING LIMITED
WAYNE MANUFACTURING LIMITED 1990 1991 1992 1993
R'OOO R'OOO R'OOO R'OOO
(Yr 1) (Yr 2) (Yr 3) (Yr 4)
CALCULATION OF FREE CASH FLOW -1989
INCOME AFTER TAX 7,895 9,232 6,198 2,349
ADD BACK DEPRECIATION 4,284 4,718 6,056 6,000
12,179 13,950 12,254 8,349
(INCREASE)/DECREASE IN WORKING CAPITAL (13,140) (975) (9.412) (1,231)
(961) 12,975 2,842 7,118
DEDUCT CAPEX (FROM AFS) (2,632) (5,205) (5,500) (4,500)
FREE CASH FLOW (3,593) 7,770 (2,658) 2,618
DISCOUNT RATE 17.17% 17.17% 17.17% 17.17%
DISCOUNT FACTOR 0.8535 0.7284 0.6217 0.5306
NET PRESENT VALUE (3,066) 5,660 (1,652) 1,389
CUMULATIVE NET PRESENT VALUE (3,066) 2,593 941 2,330
TERMINAL VALUE
EARNINGS IN 1993 2,349
PIE RATIO (JUNE 1993) 12.9
VALUE OF COMPANY (= EARNINGS x PIE) 30,302
TERMINAL VALUE (30,302 x 0.5306) 16,078
VALUATION OF COMPANY R'OOO
CUMULATIVE NET PRESENT VALUE (YR 4) 2,330
TERMINAL VALUE - YR 4 16,078
TOTAL VALUE 18.408
NUMBER OF SHARES IN ISSUE 60,732,294
VALUE PER SHARE (CENTS) 30.31
PRICE PER SHARE IN 1989 (CENTS) - PAID 95.00
APPENDIX 3
WAYNE SHARE PRICES AND ALSI
MONTH WAYNE MONTH ALSI
ocr87 65 ocr87 1,627
NOV87 70 NOV87 1,432
DEC'87 70 DEC'87 1,396
JAN'88 75 JAN'88 1,281
FEB'88 70 FEB'88 1,248
MAR'88 70 MAR'88 1,360
APR'88 70 APR'88 1,715
MAY'88 70 MAY'88 1,676
JUNE'88 70 JUNE'88 1,755
JULY'88 70 JULY'88 1,812
AUG'88 70 AUG'88 1,724
SEPr88 70 SEPr88 1,849
ocr88 70 ocr88 1,968
NOV88 70 NOV88 1,961
DEC'88 70 DEC'88 2,105
JAN'89 70 JAN'89 2,158
FEB'89 55 FEB'89 2,285
MAR'89 75 MAR'89 2,533
APR'89 75 APR'89 2,594
MAY'89 85 MAY'89 2,398
JUNE'89 90 JUNE'89 2,590
JULY'89 88 JULY'89 2,629
AUG'89 80 AUG'89 2,775
SEPr89 100 SEPr89 2,667
ocr89 85 ocr89 2,589
NOV89 81 NOV89 2,751
DEC'89 81 DEC'89 2,875
JAN'90 60 JAN'90 3,135
FEB'90 60 FEB'90 3,621
MAR'90 60 MAR'90 3,261
APR.'90 60 APR'90 3,032
MAY'90 60 MAY'90 3,188
JUNE'90 60 JUNE'90 3,077
JULY'90 48 JULY'90 3,151
AUG'90 62 AUG'90 2,993
SEPr90 58 SEPr90 2,744
OCT90 55 OCT90 2,667
NOV90 55 NOV90 2,601
DEC'90 55 DEC'90 2,720
JAN'91 62 JAN'91 2,556
FEB'91 65 FEB'91 2,803
MAR'91 65 MAR'91 2,877
APR'91 95 APR'91 3,033
MAY'91 80 MAY'91 3,115
JUNE'91 80 JUNE'91 3,306
JULY'91 90 JULY'91 3,491
AUG'91 100 AUG'91 3,349
SEPT91 95 SEPT91 3,297
OCT91 90 OCT91 3,526
NOV91 87 NOV91 3,542
DEC'91 87 DEC'91 3,440
JAN'92 83 JAN'92 3,605
FEB'92 83 FEB'92 3,597
APPENDIX 4
WAYNE SHARE PRICES AND ALSI
MONTH WAYNE MONTH ALSI
MAR'92 77 MAR'92 3,550
APR'92 75 APR'92 3,454
MAY'92 81 MAY'92 3,732
JUNE'92 80 JUNE'92 3,655
JULY'92 70 JULY'92 3,431
AUG'92 70 AUG'92 3,150
SEPT92 65 SEPT92 3,211
OCT92 60 OCT92 3,017
NOV'92 60 NOV'92 3,192
DEC'92 60 DEC'92 3,259
JAN'93 60 JAN'93 3,433
FEB'93 63 FEB'93 3,418
MAR'93 60 MAR'93 3,560
APR'93 50 APR'93 3,733
MAY'93 50 MAY'93 3,992
JUNE'93 50 JUNE'93 4,078
JULY'93 45 JULY'93 4,177
AUG'93 62 AUG'93 4,034
SEPT93 63 SEPT93 3,770
OCT93 63 OCT93 3,916
APPENDIX 4
WAYNE SHARE PERFORMANCE-PRE AND POST MERGER
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APPENDIX 5
WAYNE AND ALSI RETURNS, AND REGRESSION TABLE
WAYNE ALSI
OCT'87 65 1627
NOV87 70 0.0769 1432 -0.1199 NOV87 0.0769 -0.1199
DEC'87 70 0.0000 1396 -0.0251 DEC'87 0.0000 -0.0251
JAN'88 75 0.0714 1281 -0.0824 JAN'88 0.0714 -0.0824
FEB'88 70 -0.0667 1248 -0.0258 FEB'88 -0.0667 -0.0258
MAR'88 70 0.0000 1360 0.0897 MAR'88 0.0000 0.0897
APR'88 70 0.0000 1715 0.2610 APR'88 0.0000 0.2610
MAY'88 70 0.0000 1676 -0.0227 MAY'88 0.0000 -0.0227
JUNE'88 70 0.0000 1755 0.0471 JUNE'88 0.0000 0.0471
JULY'88 70 0.0000 1812 0.0325 JULY'88 0.0000 0.0325
AUG'88 70 0.0000 1724 -0.0486 AUG'88 0.0000 -0.0486
SEPT'88 70 0.0000 1849 0.0725 SEPT'88 0.0000 0.0725
OCT'88 70 0.0000 1968 0.0644 OCT'88 0.0000 0.0644
NOV88 70 0.0000 1961 -0.0036 NOV88 0.0000 -0.0036
DEC'88 70 0.0000 2105 0.0734 DEC'88 0.0000 0.0734
JAN'89 70 0.0000 2158 0.0252 JAN'89 0.0000 0.0252
FEB'89 55 -0.2143 2285 0.0589 FEB'89 -0.2143 0.0589
MAR'89 75 0.3636 2533 0.1085 MAR'89 0.3636 0.1085
APR'89 75 0.0000 2594 0.0241 APR'89 0.0000 0.0241
MAY'89 85 0.1333 2398 -0.0755 MAY'89 0.1333 -0.0755
JUNE'89 90 0.0588 2590 0.0801 JUNE'89 0.0588 0.0801
JULY'89 88 -0.0222 2629 0.0148 JULY'89 -0.0222 0.0148
AUG'89 80 -0.0909 2775 0.0558 AUG'89 -0.0909 0.0558
SEPT'89 100 0.2500 2667 -0.0390 SEPT'89 0.2500 -0.0390
OCT'89 85 -0.1500 2589 -0.0291 OCT'89 -0.1500 -0.0291
NOV89 81 -0.0471 2751 0.0623 NOV89 -0.0471 0.0623
DEC'89 81 0.0000 2875 0.0451 DEC'89 0.0000 0.0451
JAN'90 60 -0.2593 3135 0.0904 JAN'90 -0.2593 0.0904
FEB'90 60 0.0000 3621 0.1551 FEB'90 0.0000 0.1551
MAR'90 60 0.0000 3261 -0.0995 MAR'90 0.0000 -0.0995
APR'90 60 0.0000 3032 -0.0702 APR'90 0.0000 -0.0702
MAY'90 60 0.0000 3188 0.0515 MAY'90 0.0000 0.0515
JUNE'90 60 0.0000 3077 -0.0349 JUNE'90 0.0000 -0.0349
JULY'90 48 -0.2000 3151 0.0243 JULY'90 -0.2000 0.0243
AUG'90 62 0.2917 2993 -0.0502 AUG'90 0.2917 -0.0502
SEPT'90 58 -0.0645 2744 -0.0832 SEPT'90 -0.0645 -0.0832
OCT'90 55 -0.0517 2667 -0.0283 OCT'90 -0.0517 -0.0283
NOV90 55 0.0000 2601 -0.0247 NOV90 0.0000 -0.0247
DEC'90 55 0.0000 2720 0.0458 DEC'90 0.0000 0.0458
JAN'91 62 0.1273 2556 -0.0604 JAN'91 0.1273 -0.0604
FEB'91 65 0.0484 2803 0.0970 FEB'91 0.0484 0.0970
MAR'91 65 0.0000 2877 0.0264 MAR'91 0.0000 0.0264
APR'91 95 0.4615 3033 0.0541 APR'91 0.4615 0.0541
MAY'91 80 -0.1579 3115 0.0269 MAY'91 -0.1579 0.0269
JUNE'91 80 0.0000 3306 0.0613 JUNE'91 0.0000 0.0613
JULY'91 90 0.1250 3491 0.0561 JULY'91 0.1250 0.0561
AUG'91 100 0.1111 3349 -0.0409 AUG'91 0.1111 -0.0409
SEPT'91 95 -0.0500 3297 -0.0154 SEPT'91 -0.0500 -0.0154
OCT'91 90 -0.0526 3526 0.0693 OCT'91 -0.0526 0.0693
NOV91 87 -0.0333 3542 0.0046 NOV91 -0.0333 0.0046
DEC'91 87 0.0000 3440 -0.0287 DEC'91 0.0000 -0.0287
JAN'92 83 -0.0460 3605 0.0478 JAN'92 -0.0460 0.0478
FEB'92 83 0.0000 3597 -0.0021 FEB'92 0.0000 -0.0021
MAR'92 77 -0.0723 3550 -0.0132 MAR'92 -0.0723 -0.0132
APR'92 75 -0.0260 3454 -0.0270 APR'92 -0.0260 -0.0270
MAY'92 81 0.0800 3732 0.0805 MAY'92 0.0800 0.0805
APPENDIX 6
WAYNE AND ALSI RETURNS, AND REGRESSION TABLE
WAYNE ALSI
JUNE'92 80 -0.0123 3655 -0.0205 JUNE'92 -0.0123 -0.0205
JULY'92 70 -0.1250 3431 -0.0613 JULY'92 -0.1250 -0.0613
AUG'92 70 0.0000 3150 -0.0819 AUG'92 0.0000 -0.0819
SEPT92 65 -0.0714 3211 0.0195 SEPT92 -0.0714 0.0195
OCT92 60 -0.0769 3017 -0.0606 OCT92 -0.0769 -0.0606
NOV92 60 0.0000 3192 0.0582 NOV92 0.0000 0.0582
DEC'92 60 0.0000 3259 0.0208 DEC'92 0.0000 0.0208
JAN'93 60 0.0000 3433 0.0534 JAN'93 0.0000 0.0534
FEB'93 63 0.0500 3418 -0.0043 FEB'93 0.0500 -0.0043
MAR'93 60 -0.0476 3560 0.0415 MAR'93 -0.0476 0.0415
APR'93 50 -0.1667 3733 0.0486 APR'93 -0.1667 0.0486
MAY'93 50 0.0000 3992 0.0695 MAY'93 0.0000 0.0695
JUNE'93 50 0.0000 4078 0.0214 JUNE'93 0.0000 0.0214
JULY'93 45 -0.1000 4177 0.0242 JULY'93 -0.1000 0.0242
AUG'93 62 0.3778 4034 -0.0341 AUG'93 0.3778 -0.0341
SEPT'93 63 0.0161 3770 -0.0654 SEPT'93 0.0161 -0.0654











df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.001586031 0.001586031 0.385281 0.536806238
Residual 70 0.288158952 0.004116556
Total 71 0.289744983
CoeffICients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.014462689 0.007571212 1.910221165 0.060202 -0.000637604 0.029563 -0.0006376 0.02956298








































































































































44 0.014462689 0.046882553 0.735909431 60.416666667 0.0386803
45 0.009545290 0.046587515 0.731278255 61.805555556 0.0414933
46 0.010091668 -0.051005549 -0.800627577 63.194444444 0.0450854
47 0.016429649 -0.031847894 -0.499912321 64.583333333 0.0457844
48 0.016533173 0.052775289 0.828406960 65.972222222 0.0471360
49 0.015773995 -0.011147714 -0.174984247 67.361111111 0.0477719
50 0.014462689 -0.043123095 -0.676897705 68.7500000OO 0.0486015
51 0.016271388 0.031500470 0.494458848 70.138888889 0.0514995
52 0.014462689 -0.016554426 -0.259852703 71.527777778 0.0534099
53 0.017306486 -0.030517055 -0.479022299 72.916666667 0.0541476
54 0.015484486 -0.042464991 -0.666567529 74.305555556 0.0557880
55 0.011315554 0.069145847 1.085373512 75.694444444 0.0561328
56 0.014948358 -0.035480390 -0.556931141 77.083333333 0.0581686
57 0.019380088 -0.080696984 -1.266690231 78.472222222 0.0588508
58 0.014462689 -0.096337017 -1.512189819 79.861111111 0.0613452
59 0.017272631 0.002199890 0.034531390 81.2500000OO 0.0622946
60 0.017488781 -0.078106825 -1.226032835 82.638888889 0.0643591
61 0.014462689 0.043705870 0.686045444 84.027777778 0.0693085
62 0.014462689 0.006378541 0.100123143 85.416666667 0.0695153
63 0.014462689 0.038947197 0.611349164 86.805555556 0.0725058
64 0.012495729 -0.016769196 -0.263223927 88.194444444 0.0734319
65 0.016335984 0.025157343 0.394891589 89.583333333 0.0801186
66 0.021019221 0.027582312 0.432956018 90.972222222 0.0804614
67 0.014462689 0.055052632 0.864154124 92.361111111 0.0897436
68 0.014462689 0.006937490 0.108896889 93.7500000OO 0.0903750
69 0.018396608 0.005816657 0.091303315 95.138888889 0.0969835
70 -0.000398784 -0.033683391 -0.528723882 96.527777778 0.1085339
71 0.013828186 -0.079249372 -1.243967248 97.916666667 0.1551166
72 0.014462689 0.024217660 0.380141504 99.305555556 0.2610294
APPENDIX 7
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